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Abstract 
The selection of financing is a critical issue for firms, especially the long-term financing in which leads to firm’s future 
investment opportunity. Choice of long-term financing mix employed by the firm are called capital structure, composing 
financing from debt, equity and hybrid securities that a firm uses to generate its assets, operations and future growth. Capital 
structure decisions therefore are one of the most important issues in financial management in which can contribute to maximize 
the firm’s value. Likewise, capital structure decisions affect the cost of capital and capital budgeting decisions. In the papers of 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that capital structure or method of financing is irrelevant to the value of firm under the 
perfect market assumptions while Modigliani and Miller (1963) argued that capital structure is relevant with firm value under 
taxation condition. Subsequent researchers have relaxed assumptions such as bankruptcy cost, non-debt tax shield, agency cost, 
asymmetric information, and have introduced capital market frictions into the model. Seemingly, the main factors affecting 
capital structure decisions are related to these frictions. 
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Introduction 
Capital structure theories which explain a firm’s behavior in choosing its financing are the trade-off theory, 
the pecking order theory. The static trade-off theory proposed that firms balance the benefits and costs from their 
financing choices. Firms favor debt financing over equity issuing because of gain from debt tax shield. There are 
also bankruptcy cost, cost of financial distress for debt financing. The more debt is employed, the more are financial 
distress; the higher debt ratio, the higher will be the probability of bankruptcy. Another cost that can be weighed 
against the debt tax benefit is the agency cost. It explains that managers of levered firms tend to transfer risk if firms 
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have free cash flow. Particularly, they favor risky projects that benefit shareholders in case of success, but create 
losses on bondholders in case of failure. Thus, rational bond investors prevent this overinvestment problem by 
demanding a risk premium and a higher interest payment as a compensation of this behavior. This type of agency 
cost reduces the attractiveness for firms to issue debt. This is the risk-transferring hypothesis.  
Managers of debt-financed firms have incentive to skip the positive net present value or good projects if 
only bondholders receive the gains from these projects. This is the underinvestment hypothesis. 
However, leverage can create a disciplining effect. Specifically, managers are forced to generate enough 
cash flow to meet debt repayments resulting to decrease in ability to invest in overinvested projects. Meanwhile, 
dividend payment, share repurchase and interest payment represents a good signal to the market. This is the free 
cash flow hypothesis. Although debt can lead to overinvestment and underinvestment problems and have impact on 
agency conflicts, hence managers should consider both agency costs of debt against agency costs of equity.   
The next major capital structure theory is the pecking order theory. It was first presented by Myers and 
Majluf (1984) and Myers (1984). It is based on asymmetric information between managers and outside investors 
leading to adverse selection so that managers will issue new equity when the firm is overvalued only. Packing order 
theory has no predictions about an optimal leverage ratio, but firm’s capital choice is the results of firm’s financing 
needs over times with minimizing cost of adverse selection. The pecking order theory ranks financing sources 
according to the degree they are affected by asymmetric information, where internal funds show lowest cost of 
adverse selection and equity financing has the highest adverse selection cost. Therefore a firm firstly employs 
internal funds to avoid asymmetric information and adverse selection problems; next a firm will use issuance of debt 
because of a fixed claim of debt; hybrid securities are the later way of financing; and issuance of equity is the last 
financing choice.  
In accordance with empirical investigation of Frank and Goyal (2009), the most of firm-specific factors 
affecting corporate capital structure are firm size, profitability, tangibility, growth and volatility. Hence, the objective 
of the paper is to examine the influences of the selected variables that relate the capital structure theories based on 
the firm financing mix in the Thai listed companies. 
 
2. Research Methodology 
2.1 Data and Variables 
The annual data on 144 listed firms in the Stock Exchange of Thailand for the twelve years from 2000 to 
2011 are collected from the Datastream database.  
The dependent variables or leverage ratios (LR) are measured three debt ratios definitions with regard to 
the wide and narrow meanings of leverage, and the consideration of the book-value or market-value. First, The total 
(book-value) debt ratio (TBDR) is calculated as total liabilities divided by the sum of total liabilities and book value 
of equity. Second, the long-term (book-value) debt ratio (LTBDR) is calculated as the long-term liabilities divided 
by the sum of long-term liabilities and book value of equity. Third, the long-term (market-value) debt ratio 
(LTMDR) is calculated as the long-term liabilities divided by the sum of long-term liabilities and market value of 
equity. 
The explanatory variables are the determinants of firm-specific financing choices that are adopted from 
previous research of Frank and Goyal (2009) that are firm size (SIZE), profitability (PRO), asset tangibility (TAN), 
growth opportunity (GRO), business risk or volatility (VOL). 
The trade-off theory of capital structure predicts that leverage increases with firm size, profitability, 
tangibility, and it decreases with growth opportunity and volatility. Nevertheless, the pecking order theory predicts 
that leverage decreases with firm size, profitability, tangibility, volatility, but growth opportunity is still unclear.  
2.2 Statistical Methods 
Multiple regression analysis is employed to examine the relationship between the firm capital structure and 
the related explanatory variables.  
 The following specification has been studied: 
Leverage ratio = f (firm size, profitability, tangibility, growth opportunity, volatility) 
itit55it44it33it22it110it XXXXXY ε+β++β++β++β++β+β=   
where itY  is the leverage ratios of book and market value for firm i  the period t. it.X is one of 
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determinants (SIZE, PRO, TAN, GRO, VOL)  influencing its firm capital structure for firm i  the period t. itε  is an 
error term. 
3. Empirical Results 
 The descriptive statistics of all explanatory variables are presented in Table 1. The minimum, maximum, 
mean and standard deviation of firm size is 12.39, 21.47, 15.68 and 1.78 respectively. The minimum, maximum, 
mean and standard deviation of profitability is -.55, .54, .06 and .09 respectively. The minimum, maximum, mean 
and standard deviation of asset tangibility is .00, .97, .38 and .23 respectively. The minimum, maximum, mean and 
standard deviation of growth is -184.07, 36.57, 1.21 and 4.9 respectively. The minimum, maximum, mean and 
standard deviation of volatility is .00, .36, .05 and .04 respectively. 
Furthermore, the total book value debt ratio has minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation values 
of .00, 1.72, .47 and .25 respectively. The long-term book value debt ratio has minimum, maximum, mean and 
standard deviation values of -6.74, 15.54, .29 and .51 respectively. The long-term market value debt ratio has 
minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation values of -.02, 2.17, .28 and .28 respectively.  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2 present the results of three regression models. There is no multicallinearity in all models according 
tolerance coefficients and variance inflation factor (VIF). However, there is no autocorrelation for model 3 but 
positive autocorrelation for model 1 and model 2 according to the Durbin-Watson (DW). According R square 
adjustment coefficients, the regression line fit to data imperfectly. 
 The results emphasize a significant positive relationship between firm size and leverage in accordance with 
trade-off theory. The bigger firm is, the higher debt financing raise. There is a significant inverse relationship 
between profitability and leverage referring to pecking order theory. The more profit a firm gains, the less debt uses.   
 
Table 2 Results of multiple regressions 
  N Constant SIZE PRO TAN GRO VOL adj.R2 DW F-stat p-value 
Predicted sign:  TOT 
Predicted sign:  POT 
  + 
- 
+ 
- 
+ 
- 
- 
+/- 
- 
- 
    
Model 1 All firms 1728 -.577 .067 -1.078 .096 .001 .494 .363 .428 197.578 .000** 
(TBDR) t-stat  -11.989 23.594 -20.286 4.500 .755 4.245     
 p-value  .000** .000** .000** .000** .448 .000**     
 Tolerance   .960 .961 .979 .979 .950     
 VIF   1.042 1.041 1.021 1.021 1.053     
Model 2 All firms 1728 -.896 .077 .946 .031 -.001 .420 .970 1.907 38.043 .000** 
(LTBDR) t-stat  -7.851 11.451 -7.492 .616 -.356 1.504     
 p-value  .000** .000** .000** .538 .722 .133     
 Tolerance   .960 .961 .979 .979 .950     
 VIF   1.042 1.041 1.021   1.021 1.053     
Model 3 All firms 1728 -.638 .064 -1.276 .014 -.002 -.147 .333 .616 173.168 .000** 
(N=1728)  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
SIZE 12.39 21.47 15.6870 1.78022 
PRO -.55 .54 .0600 .09522 
TAN .00 .97 .3828 .23613 
GRO -184.07 36.57 1.2179 4.97732 
VOL .00 .36 .0534 .04333 
TBDR .00 1.72 .4752 .25822 
LTBDR -6.74 15.54 .2934 .51522 
LTMDR -.02 2.17 .2828 .28562 
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(LTMDR) t-stat  -11.723 19.853 -21.217 .570 -1.884 -1.104     
 p-value  .000** .000** .000** .569 .060 .270     
 Tolerance   .960 .961 .979 .979 .950     
 VIF   1.042 1.041 1.021 1.021 1.053     
 
4. Conclusion 
As capital structure is important to the company to generate its assets, operations and future growth and 
finally result to maximize the valuation of firm. Thus, what is the determinant of firm capital structure is a basic 
question of the study. For listed company in Thailand stock exchange market, the study confirms that leverage ratios 
increase with firm size, and decrease with profitability significantly. Nonetheless, there are no significant 
relationships between tangibility, growth opportunity, business risk and leverage ratios. In sum, the firm size and 
profitability are significant determinants of capital structure in Thailand. 
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